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The financial sector and, in particular, the banking industry plays
an important role in the allocation of capital resources and risk shar-
ing of future flows in an economy. In the long run, a well-functioning
banking sector will facilitate increased growth and welfare, and it
will smooth business cycles. These findings have become widely ac-
cepted by policymakers and economists, and they stand in contrast to
the skepticism about the contribution of financial intermediaries that
predominated twenty years ago.
Banks perform a variety of functions. Historically, they have pro-
vided money changing and payment processing services. The latter
function has gained relevance at the international level owing to the
greater integration of financial services. Banks primary function has
also been related to the transformation of assets in terms of their ma-
turity, quality, and denomination. Recently, researchers and
policymakers have acknowledged that a critical role of banks is to
manage and control risks. These functions give banks a central posi-
tion within the process of saving and investment allocation. However,
these functions make banks vulnerable to different sources of shocks,
and they have a negative effect on the economy because of banks’ cen-
tral role. Consequently, there is a case for strong regulations in a banking
environment. Issues like barriers to entry, market concentration, the
borrower-lender relationship, deposit insurance, and the taxation of
financial intermediation are at the center of the economic policy dis-
cussion to improve the performance of the financial market.
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From a macroeconomic perspective, the nature of banking activi-
ties and banks’ position as intermediaries makes these institutions
relevant for the transmission of monetary policy. Two important chan-
nels of monetary policy transmission depend on the functioning of
the banking sector: the traditional interest rate channel and the credit
channel. The former channel operates when the central bank’s ad-
justments to the nominal interest rate have an impact on the real
interest rate (assuming a degree of price stickiness) and thus on the
pattern of investment and consumption. This channel will only work,
however, if banks transmit the changes in the monetary policy rate
to their customers. The credit channel, in turn, assumes some capi-
tal market imperfections, such as asymmetric information, that in-
duce a contraction of the quantity of credit when the central bank
imposes a restrictive monetary policy.
The papers presented in this book discuss some of these issues.
The first group of papers studies the importance of the banking in-
dustry in the transmission of monetary policy and the interest rate
pass-through from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The sec-
ond group analyzes microeconomic topics related to regulation and
market structure, such as taxation of the financial sector, barriers to
entry in the banking sector, and deposit insurance.
1. MONETARY POLICY AND THE BANKING INDUSTRY
In a simple textbook economy, agents hold two types of assets:
bonds and money. Agents’ portfolios are balanced between these two
assets at all times. When the monetary authority controls the quan-
tity of money, therefore, it is also controlling the nominal interest
rate in the market. In this so-called money view, banks are agents
that issue demand deposit on the liability side of their balance sheet
and hold bonds on the asset side of their balance sheet.1
In such a framework, monetary policy affects output only if move-
ments in the nominal interest rate are translated into the real inter-
est rate. If there is some level of price stickiness, changes in the
nominal interest rate will induce movements in the real interest rate
and thus affect real activity in the short run.
1. See Kashyap and Stein (1994) for a complete summary of the two different
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In practice banks introduce a third type of asset: bank loans
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). Bank balance sheet thus consist of
three type of assets: money, bonds, and intermediated loans. Two
conditions of the latter, in addition to price stickiness, now create a
second channel for monetary policy transmission, namely, the bank-
lending channel. These conditions are that bank loans and bonds are
imperfect substitutes for both banks and borrowers and that the Cen-
tral Bank must be able to use the monetary policy to affect the total
supply of funds that are available for banks.
This section proceeds as follows. We first review the empirical
and theoretical foundations of credit channel, together with the con-
tribution of this volume’s papers to the literature. We then discuss
the role of banks for the money view and the contributions of the
volume in this area.
1.1 Credit Channel: Theoretical Considerations
The empirical side of the bank lending channel hypothesis con-
centrates on how bank loans and other plausible substitutes react to
monetary policy shocks. Evidence of the bank lending channel is found
when commercial papers and bank loans are close substitutes
(Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993).
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide a well-organized view of the
empirical relationship of monetary policy and aggregates variables
that could not be explained using the traditional view of monetary
policy. They divide the credit channel into the bank lending channel
and the balance sheet effect. They argue, however, that bank lending
is becoming less important as a channel for monetary policy trans-
mission owing to changes in regulation, like the ending of Regulation
Q, and increasing innovation in financial markets. Their study thus
emphasizes the balance sheet effect, which operates through two
complementary mechanisms. First, a monetary policy tightening in-
creases interest expenses, reduces net cash flow, and weakens the
financial position of firms. Second, an increase in the interest rate
reduces the value of the borrower’s collateral and, consequently, the
borrowing ability of affected firms. In this mechanism, asymmetric
information in financial market plays an important role.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) provide microeconomic evidence in favor
of the above balance sheet effect. They study how small and large
manufacturing firms react to a monetary policy shock. A monetary
policy tightening causes sales, inventories, and short term debt to4 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
decline for small firms, but they remain unchanged for large firms.
The authors conclude that financial factors are behind the difference
between large and small firm behavior.
Gertler and Gilchrist’s findings are closely related with the idea
that financial factors will propagate the effect of a monetary shock.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) argue that a negative mon-
etary shock will make external finance more expensive relative to
funds raised internally; the difference between these two costs is the
external finance premium. Since the net worth of the firm is inversely
related to the external finance premium for a given amount of fi-
nance required, the shrink in the net worth will reduce the borrower’s
spending and production. This is the idea of the financial accelerator
and the flight to quality, which hinges on the asymmetric informa-
tion and agency cost features of the financial market. In practice this
will mean that large publicly listed firms would be less exposed to the
financial accelerator, and they will be the recipients of funds.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) formalize this idea in a
dynamic macroeconomic model characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation and agency cost in the banking sector. Calibrating the model,
they show that the financial accelerator mechanism amplifies the
response of the aggregate variables to a monetary shock.
Following this theoretical avenue, Simon Gilchrist (in this vol-
ume) presents a model that shows the importance of the financial
accelerator mechanism in a context of open economies. In his model
the macroeconomic effects of a shock depend on the source of the
shock and the leverage of the economy. The net worth of firms in a
high-leverage economy is more sensitive to demand and supply shocks
than is the net worth of firms in low-leverage economies. Shocks
raise the external finance premium, which magnifies their effect.
This model would explain why a supply shock in a developed
economy has such a large effect in developing countries. Gilchrist as-
sociates high-leverage economies with developing countries, which is
the case in the recent Asian crisis. The transmission mechanism of
the shock is the following. A negative supply shock in the developed
country produces a negative demand shock in the developing country;
this unexpectedly reduces the real return to capital and the net worth
of assets. The effect on the net worth depends on the leverage of the
economy. The inverse relationship between the net worth and the ex-
ternal finance premium predicts a reduction in investment and out-
put. The impact of the shock on the net worth is magnified in the less
developed economy, owing to the leverage associated to that economy.Banking Industry and Monetary Policy: An Overview 5
With regard to the source of the shock, Gilchrist finds that a sym-
metric shock to disembodied technology in both countries introduces
larger waves in output and investment than a similar shock to embod-
ied technology. The presence of the financial accelerator magnifies the
effect in both economies, but it is greater for the economy with higher
leverage.
1.2 Credit Channel: Empirical Findings
Two papers in this volume deal with the empirical side of the
relationship between monetary policy and macroeconomic aggregates.
Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon, and Terlizzese show similarities and dif-
ferences in the monetary policy transmission in two large economies:
the United States and the euro area. The aim of the paper is to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the components of aggregate de-
mand through which the monetary policy operates. The authors make
an important effort to construct comparable data since the euro area
only covers a five-year period.
Using VAR models under different specifications, they find that
both economies show the same response in output and prices. Spe-
cifically, output in both economies has a hump-shaped response to a
monetary shock, peaking sometime during the second year. Prices
tend to react more slowly, but with a long-term deviation from the
baseline situation and with no long-run effect on inflation. The most
striking feature found, however, is the response of the different com-
ponents of aggregate demand, which constitutes what the authors
call the output composition puzzle. Briefly, the puzzle implies that in
the U.S. economy the consumption-to-investment ratio tends to have
a larger reaction than its European counterpart.
Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon, and Terlizzese try to explain this puzzle
based on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with certain
specific assumptions that capture what is observed in the data in terms
of stickiness and inertia in the inflation rate. They argued that five
parameters could explain the difference: the size of investment adjust-
ment costs, the persistence in the interest rate induced by the central
bank, the strength of habit persistence, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and the share of capital in the production function. How-
ever, the data show a much larger difference in consumption and
investment reaction than could be accounted for in the model.
Finally, the authors find that investment response is similar in both
economies and that the difference comes from consumption decisions.6 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
They show evidence that disposable income is less sensible to monetary
policy in the euro area than in the United States. They conjecture that
the social benefits in Europe, which are much higher than in the United
States, help to smooth the effect of monetary policy on disposable in-
come and consumption.
The paper by Alfaro, Franken, García, and Jara (in this volume)
focuses on the bank channel of the monetary policy transmission in
Chile. They follow two methodologies. First, they use panel data to
check how bank characteristics (size, liquidity, and capitalization)
matter for the response of loan supply to movements in the mon-
etary policy rate. Second, they estimate a VAR system to analyze a
flight-to-quality hypothesis, by constructing a low/high quality ratio
as the ratio of consumer loans to large firm loans.
From the first empirical exercise, they find that monetary policy
tightening is consistent with a reduction in the growth rate of total
loans, which favor the bank lending channel hypothesis. Bank char-
acteristics may enhance or reduce this effect. For instance, in the
case of consumer loans, capitalization and liquidity tend to reduce
the effect of monetary policy on the supply of loans. In contrast, the
derivative of commercial loans to monetary policy rate is only af-
fected by liquidity. The authors read these results as evidence in fa-
vor of the bank lending channel, in the sense that monetary policy
tightening operates against consumers and small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs).
The second exercise produces evidence that monetary policy pre-
cedes the low/high quality ratio (in the Granger sense), while the
latter statistically precedes macroeconomic activity. From the VAR
itself, the authors find that a negative monetary policy shock imme-
diately reduces the low/high quality ratio, which tends to favor the
flight-to-quality effect explained above. Gross domestic product (GDP)
declines two quarters after the negative shock, reaching its maxi-
mum decline one year after the shock. This effect is transitory, as
expected. The estimated impulse response shows that if investment
and durable consumption replace GDP, both variables decline almost
at the same time (one and a half years after the monetary policy
tightening).
1.3 Interest Rate Pass-through
The traditional channel of monetary policy does not take into
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rate. This sector is a key element, however, since a noncompetitive
banking sector may not fully pass through or may delay the trans-
mission of the changes in the monetary policy rate to borrowers.
This will affect the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The importance of the banking sector for passing through the
policy rate is studied indirectly by Hannan and Berger (1991), who
model interest rate rigidity as a consequence of collusive behavior in
the banking sector. Hannan and Berger provide a stylized model of
monopolistic competition that illustrates how firms with market power
change prices asymmetrically for ups versus downs.
On the empirical side, the comprehensive work of Cottarelli and
Kourelis (1994) shows that the stickiness of the lending interest rate
varies widely across the thirty-one countries included in the study.
They fit a simple empirical model in which the lending rate is a func-
tion of contemporaneous and lag values of the money market rate,
lags of the lending rate, and changes in the monetary policy rate.
Their main finding is that the degree of interest rate flexibility in-
creases with the elimination of capital flow restrictions, lower barri-
ers to competition, private property in the banking industry, and the
existence of short-term instruments. More competition implies a more
flexible interest rate.
Several recent country case studies use this methodology; most
find that stickiness varies inversely with the degree of competition
and financial liberalization.2 Other papers study specific countries,
including Manzano and Galmés (1996) for Spain, Winker (1999) for
Germany, and Moazzami (1999) for the United States and Canada. All
of these find a certain degree of stickiness in the short run and a
higher long-run pass-through coefficient. The type of borrowers, regu-
lation, and changes in the level of competition seem to be the main
determinants of interest rate flexibility.
In this volume, Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci compare the speed of
the interest rate pass-through in Chile with that of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United States, and a group of European econo-
mies. They work with an auto-regressive distributed lag specification
reparameterized as an error correction model with lending and de-
posit rates for different terms and denominations.3 They find that
Chile is not very different than these countries. In fact, the long-run
2. See Borio and Fritz (1995) and Mojon (2000) for cross-country comparisons.
3. One of the peculiarities of the Chilean economy is the existence of an
indexed unit of account that is widely used in the financial sector for loans and
deposit over ninety days.8 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
coefficient is similar to that found in European economies and New
Zealand, and somewhat smaller than in Australia, Canada, and the
United States. The short-run adjustment was faster than in Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and Europe.
For Chile, Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci find no evidence of differ-
ences in the speed of instruments denominated in UF (the indexed
unit of account) and pesos (nominal). Their work also shows no evi-
dence of asymmetries in the speed of the interest rate pass-through
for ups and downs of the monetary policy rate. This finding goes against
the Hannan and Berger (1991) hypothesis.
The second paper on this topic, by Berstein and Fuentes, pre-
sents a country case study for Chile. The authors’ goal is twofold.
First, they explore how the banking interest rate responds to changes
in the policy rate using aggregate data for the banking system, based
on a dynamic model for the lending rate as a function of the money
market rate. Second, they analyze whether the speed of adjustment
depends on specific characteristics of individual banks. Here they es-
timate a dynamic panel data model assuming that the coefficient de-
pends on certain bank characteristic, such as size, risk portfolio, and
type of borrowers.
Using aggregate data, they find that the short-term pass-through
coefficient is around 0.8 for both indexed and nominal interest rate.
The long-term coefficient is larger, and the hypothesis of it being
equal to 1 cannot be rejected. Large banks or large borrowers may
influence these results, since the interest rate used is a weighted
average of interest rates in individual banks, in which the weights
are based on the size of the loan. An additional limitation is that this
approach does not allow controlling for specific bank characteristics.
Next Berstein and Fuentes set up a very simple monopolistic com-
petition model for the banking industry, deriving a mark-up equation
for the equilibrium interest rate. The mark-up depends on the borrow-
ers’ demand elasticity and the repayment probability of the loan. They
add to this structure a quadratic cost function faced by banks when
they have to adjust the interest rate. The intuition for this is that if the
debtors are too risky, the bank may not fully pass through a money
market interest rate increase (in the short run) because it will stifle
the debtors. In the long run, however, the interest rate charged will be
according to the risk characteristic of the debtor (mark-up equation).
They use this model to derive an empirical equation that allows for
interaction between the determinants of demand elasticity and prob-
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Based on the panel data estimation, they conclude that the short-
term pass-through coefficient is around 0.7. The short-term coeffi-
cient for the nominal rate depends negatively on the credit risk
(measured as unpaid loans). The long-term coefficient is close to 1,
and it is positively related to this proxy for credit risk. Both results
are consistent with the theoretical model. The coefficients for the
indexed interest rate are very similar in size. They are not consis-
tent with the theoretical model, however, since a higher credit risk
corresponds with a lower long-run pass-through coefficient.
2. LENDER-BORROWER RELATIONSHIP
The interaction between monetary policy and the macroeconomic
determinants of the functioning of the economy is review in the stud-
ies cited above, which emphasize the transmission of the monetary
policy decision to macroeconomic aggregates and interest rates. The
microeconomic determinants of an effective monetary policy transmis-
sion, in turn, depend crucially on certain aspect of the real/financial
interaction between banks and the agents surrounding them. It is now
widely recognized at a theoretical level that banks do play an impor-
tant role in the economy through the provision of liquidity services,
maturity transformation, and the pooling of risks (Freixas and Rochet,
1997). However, the very nature of their activities gives rise to fric-
tions that can have real effects on the level of investment and growth.
The main source of frictions in the banking industry arises from infor-
mational asymmetries.
García, Repetto, Rodríguez, and Valdés (in this volume) explore
one source of distortion that could arise from informational asymme-
try, investigating whether firm-bank relationships (measured by the
duration of lending ties) and the actual bank concentration faced by
the firm affect the access to bank financing. They explore the pos-
sible consequences of a given market structure faced by potential
borrowers for the case of Chile over the 1990–1998 period. They pos-
tulate that the availability of credit should be greater if interactions
between banks and their clients alleviate distortions generated by
lack of information. A priori, multiple banking relationships are not
prima facie beneficial for bank clients. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
and Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that debt renegotiations become
more complicated, and greater competition reduces the ability of banks
to finance projects during bad times.10 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
A number of studies capture the strength of the relationship be-
tween banks and their clients. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)
associate large industrial Japanese groups with weaker asymmetric
information, finding that groups with weaker links to banks have
difficult access to external finance. Others rely on the market assess-
ments of rating agencies (Whited, 1992) or the concentration of own-
ership within the firm and the age of the firm as an indicator of
transparency of information (Schaller, 1993). The latter finds that
young firms and firms with more dispersed ownership face large fund-
ing costs from external sources. Asymmetric information can severely
constrain access to credit among small and medium-sized firms, and
it can also harm the efficiency of monetary policy transmission.
García, Repetto, Rodríguez, and Valdés find that low concentra-
tion, proxied by the number of banks with which the firm has formal
contracts, has a positive impact on the volume of bank lending. In the
case of Chile, the longer the duration of the relationship between a
bank and a firm, the greater the access to credit from the banking
system. Finally, a valuable contribution of their work is the interac-
tion of two unique databases. The first dataset covers information on
credit transactions between banks and their clients, including the
fraction of outstanding and past-due loans, and the credit risk rating
assigned by a bank to a particular credit. The information per cus-
tomer is matched with data from a survey of manufacturing firms
conducted annually by the National Bureau of Statistics.
3. THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN BANKING ENTRY
This volume includes contributions that analyze the effects of for-
eign bank entry on the efficiency of the banking system and on mac-
roeconomic activity. This section discusses issues related to how foreign
bank entry may affect the volatility of aggregate activity. We then
summarize contributions related to the importance of foreign bank
for efficiency in the banking system, understood as bank margins.
3.1 Foreign Bank Entry and Macroeconomic
Stability
Morgan and Strahan (in this volume) study whether foreign bank
entry alters the economic volatility of countries or states where regu-
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in terms of annual variations in output and investment). They con-
sider the potential negative consequences of opening a banking sys-
tem to foreign bank entry in terms of the resulting stability of economic
activity and bank participation. The effect of foreign bank entry on
local markets is relevant not only internationally, as in the case of
many developing economies that have opened their banking mar-
kets, but also within national boundaries, as in the case of interstate
banking in the United States.
The theoretical foundation for their work is based in Morgan,
Rime, and Strahan (2003), who extend the macroeconomic model of
Holmström and Tirole (1997). Integration of banking markets can
have positive and negative consequences for economic volatility. The
net effect is ambiguous. Assuming complete mobility of capital across
states or countries, a capital squeeze in state (country) A will attract
capital from state B if there are good lending opportunities, thereby
dampening the impact on investment in state A. Banking allocation
in state A will also attract investment by uninformed investors, en-
hancing the positive effect of integration. However, a collateral shock
that has a negative impact on capital invested in country A causes
bank capital to move to country B, because of the integration. The
reduction in bank capital in country A lowers the level of investment
in that country, together with the supply of investment by uninformed
capital (large institutional investors).
This latter flight-to-quality effect serves to illustrate the impact
of foreign bank presence, or financial service integration in general,
on the design of monetary policy. Although collateral shocks are most
likely to occur as a result of real shocks (earthquakes, plagues, and
so forth), unexpected and large changes in monetary policy can also
lead to a significantly decrease in the price of assets. Foreign bank
presence can thus reinforce the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism. In isolated markets, unexpected increases in the monetary policy
rate decrease the value of collateral, but this reduction is not en-
hanced by capital flights to other regions. Banking integration and
the sort of dynamics suggested by Morgan and Strahan also highlight
the importance of adequate tax and financial policy design, since ill-
designed policies in the context of integrated markets can also cause
a reduction of bank capital and investment in a country.
At the U.S. level, the authors find that the stabilizing influence of
integration across states is large and statistically significant. There is
also a positive effect of bank capital inflows on employment growth. The
authors control for banking market concentration, since the evidence12 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
indicates that more concentrated markets tend to exhibit less capital
volatility. They also control for some possible endogenous compo-
nents of foreign bank entry and investment volatility.
At the international level, the authors use the share of bank as-
sets held by banks with at least 50 percent foreign bank ownership as
a measure of foreign bank integration. They control for banking mar-
ket concentration as in the U.S. case, as well as for the share of
foreign trade over GDP as a measure of integration. They employ
instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of the
estimation owing to similarities in linguistic, institutional, and re-
gional characteristics of the countries involved. Contrary to the U.S.
case, the impact of bank integration on business volatility is quite
low at the international level, and the relationship even has a posi-
tive sign in some model specifications. A tentative explanation that is
explored by Morgan and Strahan suggests that collateral shocks tend
to predominate at the international level. To confirm their hypoth-
esis they regress the real growth of GDP and investment on the re-
turn on the stock market (as a proxy for entrepreneurial collateral)
and the growth rate of bank capital. They find that foreign bank pres-
ence amplifies capital shocks in the sample of countries selected.
Morgan and Strahan’s results point to a strong link between fi-
nancial integration and the volatility of economic activity in develop-
ing economies. This stands as a word of caution for financial regulators
in terms of following a blind path of integration; rather, they may
need to perform a careful study of macroeconomic conditions before
integrating into foreign banking markets. Certainly, Morgan and
Strahan’s results are not definitive, but given the potential implica-
tions, more research is needed in this area, particularly in light of
the fact that government authorities continue to strongly promote
commercial treaties.
3.2 Foreign Bank Entry and Bank Margins
The financial system is in charge of allocating resources from agents
who supply funds to those who demand funds for investment. In this
context bank margins or the bank spread is a key variable for measur-
ing how efficient a banking system is in this resource allocation pro-
cess. The need for financial intermediaries, which provide this service
while charging a spread, is widely discussed in the literature. The
early contributions emphasize transaction costs (Benston and Smith,
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monitoring (Leyland and Pyle, 1977; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Dia-
mond, 1984, 1991; Haubrich, 1989). The more recent literature stresses
risk management, transformation of financial risk, and provision of
liquidity (Allen and Santomero, 1997, 2001; Scholtens and van
Wensveen, 2000).
All these works justify the presence of financial intermediaries
and the need for incurring such costs. Under competition, the bank
margin should be high enough to pay for financial services plus the
risk involved in banking activity. In a related area, a relatively new
body of research addresses the impact of foreign bank entry on the
domestic banking system. Clarke and others (2002) study the effect of
foreign entry on different aspect of the domestic banking system.
They conclude that the presence of these banks enhance efficiency.
Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) and Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996), for the United States, provide evidence that the ex-
istence of foreign banks reduces the profitability and margins of do-
mestic banks. They argue that openness to foreign banks increases
the contestability of the market.
This evidence is consistent with Levine (1996), who reports that
the entry of foreign banks improves the quality and availability of
financial services, increases competition, and stimulates the intro-
duction of modern technologies and management tools. Based on ex-
tensive research in this area, Levine (1999) finds that the share of
foreign bank assets is negatively correlated with the probability of
crises in the incumbent markets.
In this volume, Ross Levine analyzes the impact of denying for-
eign bank entry on bank interest margins. The contribution of this
paper is to measure foreign banks’ access to the market rather than
the degree of foreign bank participation. Levine also controls for the
denial of domestic bank entry, to make sure that the barriers to en-
try are specifically against foreign banks. Otherwise the impediments
to foreign bank entry would just be a proxy for barriers to entry in
general. Levine uses a rich dataset of 1165 banks across forty-seven
countries, controling for bank-specific and country-specific factors.
He concludes that when a country tends to establish barriers to for-
eign bank entry, bank interest margins increase.
Levine uses instrumental variables to test the robustness of the
results, since the entry of a foreign bank may also be determined by
the margins. This exercise produces another interesting finding. As
instruments, Levine chose variables that capture institutional char-
acteristics. The regulation of foreign bank entry proves to be highly14 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
correlated with the institutional characteristics. This exercise confirms
the previous finding that foreign bank entry increases the degree of
contestability of the domestic market and reduces bank interest
margins.
4. MARKET CONCENTRATION, CROSS-OWNERSHIP,
AND PRICING
Ahumada and Cetorelli (in this volume) review the potential ben-
efits for banks stemming from the relationship in ownership with
other financial intermediaries. Specifically, they focus on the Chil-
ean market and study banks that have common ownership with pen-
sion fund administrators, the largest providers of external funding in
the economy. Pension funds are required by law to diversify their
portfolios. Nonetheless, the regulatory requirement for diversifica-
tion forces pension fund administrators to invest a significant propor-
tion of the funds in the domestic banking system. In addition, regulation
restricts, but does not prohibit, the allocation of a proportion of the
pension funds in a bank that belongs to the same financial group as the
pension fund administrator. This link could generate a competitive ad-
vantage for banks related to pension funds in the market for deposits
and loans.
Their work is partly based on Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan
and Berger (1991). They thus control for market characteristics that
could influence the pricing behavior of deposit and loans; in particular,
they control for the market structure of the industry, proxied by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration. They study
whether banks with links to pension funds respond to changes in mon-
etary policy differently than banks without such links, both in normal
times and during the liquidity shock that the Chilean economy suf-
fered in the aftermath the Asian crisis. Their work is further moti-
vated by the concept of internal capital markets elaborated by Stein
(1991) and subsequently extended to developing countries by Tarziján
(1999). The latter argues that internal markets provide a tentative
explanation for the rise of conglomerates in emerging markets, which
are typically characterized by a weak institutional framework, an ex-
cessive number of regulations, and shallow capital markets.
The results obtained by Ahumada and Cetorelli indicate that, in-
deed, during the sample period banks benefited from the pension fund
relationship. Related banks exhibited a larger deposit base and enjoyedBanking Industry and Monetary Policy: An Overview 15
higher spreads than unrelated banks. These results hold significantly
during the liquidity shock, when affiliated banks grew in size and
charged higher spreads while the other banks’ spread narrowed. None-
theless, the overall benefit associated with the existence of financial
groups in Chile has fallen over time, since pension fund administra-
tors have gradually been allowed to allocate their resources to for-
eign markets.
5. TAXATION ON FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: A REVIEW
The issue of taxation of financial services might seem at odds
with the other subjects in the volume. However, it is a critical comple-
ment of the different topics discussed at the conference, since distor-
tions introduced by the tax structure have become the center of the
financial policy debate on economic growth in the context of increas-
ing global competition and integration of financial services. Honohan
provides a detailed perspective on the approaches to policy recom-
mendations on this subject, and he uses the theoretical foundations
of this literature to analyze and diagnose the current situation in
Chile.
Honohan begins by describing the general framework of financial
services taxation reform as emerging from two powerful and conflict-
ing perspectives. In one area are those who advocate a widespread
simplification of the tax structure, in the form of a flat tax—such as a
value-added tax (VAT) and zero taxation of capital income—or a uni-
versal transaction tax. Conventional wisdom in the taxation litera-
ture is that capital income taxation generates high efficiency costs,
with very few offsetting benefits. In the opposing camp are the propo-
nents of a myriad of corrective taxes designed to offset the market
distortions that the financial sector is alleged to have derived mainly
from informational deficiencies and market structure conditions.
These corrective taxes include deposit insurance, provisions, and
minimum capital requirements. Honohan points out that in practical
applications, the two camps push their conflicting ideas, resulting in
most countries in a tax system that challenges even the most com-
plex rationalizations. The author concludes that the main practical
implication of the debate on financial services taxation is that policy
design should be guided by a defensive approach, in which taxes are
implemented on the basis of their ability to resist arbitrage and their
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Honohan shows that Chile is no exception to the general observa-
tion that tax policy on financial intermediation is far from being an
articulated body. The stamp tax on credit operations is the most charac-
teristic lineament of the tax structure of the Chilean financial system.
Introduced in the early 1980s, this tax encompasses all credit trans-
actions related to credit operations, is levied over the capital borrowed,
and is short-lived since it applies only to the first twelve months of the
loan. Honohan, compares the level of different taxes applied on Chile
with an equivalent value-added tax on each transaction, using, for
example, a measure of spread to approximate the value-added of the
banking industry in the case of the stamp tax. In all cases, the author
finds that the equivalent VAT rates are, at best, twice as high as the
current VAT rate of 19% for nonfinancial transactions.
The impact of the stamp tax on credit transactions is twofold.
First, it complies fully with the defensive approach outlined by the
author, in that it is immune to inflation and it limits severe arbi-
trage. Unlike a capital income tax, the stamp tax works fine against
tax evasion, which might be a particularly useful feature in countries
where the financial system is large but where, nonetheless, tax elas-
ticities are low. Although critics point out that there are obvious ways
to arbitrage this feature of stamp taxes, the evidence consistently
shows that transaction taxes are surprisingly resilient as tools for
government revenue collection, thereby raising doubts about their
distorting effects on the financial sector.
In Chile, the design of the stamp tax generates a bias toward
long-term credit, which causes a welfare loss for borrowers who might
otherwise have had access to credit at a shorter term. In the same
line of argument, other authors suggest that the stamp tax discour-
ages borrower mobility; this could have an effect on monetary policy
transmission, since borrowers do not renegotiate loans or change
bank lenders to avoid paying the stamp tax. These criticisms have
recently been taken into account by the Chilean economic authority,
which has modified financial regulation to diminish the so-called bias
in an effort to stimulate credit activity.
6. DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON
SYSTEMIC RISK
Honohan (2003) postulates that explicit deposit insurance systems
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deficiencies enshrined in the banking system. Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane
(in this volume) broaden this perspective, pointing out that deposit in-
surance systems are part of the regulatory efforts of financial authori-
ties to construct a safety net around the financial system. The safety net
is a set of institutional arrangements designed to lower the probability
of a systemic crisis and, given an episode of widespread instability, to
minimize its costs. It comprises not only a deposit insurance system, but
also a lender of last resort (a function typically performed by the central
bank) and a set of supervisory practices and financial regulations.
The series of banking crises that occurred over the last twenty
years left the certainty that they are costly and disruptive. Using
alternative measures to approximate the direct and measurable costs
of financial crisis, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane illustrate that these costs
exceeded 30% of GDP in Thailand and Korea and approached 50% of
GDP in Indonesia. In the case of the 1982 Chilean banking crisis, the
most accurate estimates of the losses incurred report figures around
35% of GDP (Sanhueza, 1999). Perhaps as a result of a natural defen-
sive response from the financial policymakers, deposit insurance sys-
tems have grown rapidly in the last thirty years, from fewer than ten
countries in 1965 to more than seventy countries in 1999, and still
more are being implemented.
Implementing a deposit insurance system has been a primary
objective of the safety net program in many countries. However, fi-
nancial policy regulators face a difficult task in designing a deposit
insurance system, since there seems to be a critical balance between
protecting the integrity of the financial system and avoiding exces-
sive risk taking by depository institutions owing to ill-structured
schemes. The contribution of Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane to this vol-
ume provides a synthesis of recent work developed by these and other
researchers, which clarifies how the design of a deposit insurance
system affects banking crises, market discipline, financial develop-
ment, and crisis management. The paper also evaluates the Chilean
deposit insurance system and compares it with results from their
cross-country study. The main finding of their work is that the
instauration of an explicit deposit insurance system represents a dan-
ger in a weak institutional environment. The evidence shows that in
that context, a deposit insurance system induces a downgrade in the
monitoring of bank risk profiles.
On the issue of financial stability, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane hold
that the first impact of deposit insurance is to enhance the banking
system, since it diminishes depositors’ willingness to run on a bank18 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
in the event of a crisis. Moral hazard increases, however, when the
deposit insurance system aims to protect small depositors. On aver-
age, deposit insurance systems increase the probability of a banking
crisis when the government administers the system and when
the system provides extensive coverage (see Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 2002).
On the issue of market discipline, the authors find that the ab-
sence of adequate monitoring that results from inadequate deposit
insurance systems switches the responsibility for controlling bad bank
behavior to supervisory institutions. These results highlight the im-
portance of having a strong set of institutions (see Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga, 2004). Again, the design of the deposit insurance sys-
tem is crucial for economic growth, since the perverse incentive cre-
ated in weak institutional environments distorts real investment
decisions, which delays rather than promotes financial development
(see Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2004). Finally, the authors review the
impact of blanket guarantees for a sample of forty crises around the
world. Based on Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) they conclude that
unlimited guarantees and liquidity support, together with indulgent
behavior from regulatory authorities, significantly increase the costs
of financial crises.
The Working Group on Deposit Insurance of the Financial Stabil-
ity Forum (2001) reaches similar conclusions to those outlined by
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane. In particular, their Guidance for Develop-
ing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems recommends that an explicit,
limited-coverage system is preferable to an implicit protection scheme.
They further acknowledge that a deposit insurance system is built to
deal with a limited number of bank failures, and it is not expected to
cover the demand from depositors in the event of a systemic banking
crisis. Nonetheless, the main public policy objective of a deposit
insurance system is to contribute to the stability of the financial sys-
tem and to protect small depositors. The emphasis should be placed
on good corporate governance practices and sound risk management
policies.
In the case of Chile, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane observe that two
characteristic of the Chilean financial system favor the application of
an explicit deposit insurance: Chile features a high level of institu-
tional development relative to other developing countries, and the
banking market is highly concentrated. These two features should
limit any adverse impact that an explicit deposit insurance system
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insurance system in Chile are favorably evaluated according to the
empirical evidence presented in their previous work. First, the cov-
erage of term deposits is low and imposes a form of coinsurance.
Coverage per depositors is currently near $3,000 dollars. Second, the
insurer of term deposits (the government) has no explicit reserve
fund. Third, membership is compulsory, as is also recommended by
the Financial Stability Forum. A downside of the current design, which
the authors mention, is the full coverage of demand deposit by the
Central Bank, despite the ceiling imposed on maximum coverage of
2.5 times basic capital; in a situation of financial instability, this could
cause depositors to shift their term deposits into demand deposits.
As mentioned by Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, the Chilean banking
industry has become a very concentrated market. In 1995, the top
five banks (out of a total of 36) held 49 percent of the market. Today,
the largest five banks (out of 27) hold 71 percent of the market. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration rose from 715
in 1995 to 1,290 in the third quarter of 2003. Cifuentes (in this vol-
ume) studies the impact of this consolidation process on the Chilean
banking industry’s safety net, in terms of both the functioning of the
deposit insurance mechanism in place and the level of systemic risk.
Cifuentes (in this volume) begins with an overview of the main
objectives and characteristics of deposit insurance systems. He makes
some of the same remarks as Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (in this vol-
ume) in their survey, emphasizing the role of deposit insurance in
the prevention of bank runs and the protection of small depositors.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the theoretical framework that
justifies the construction of a credible system of protection for small
depositors as a sustainable equilibrium in a market characterized by
unstable conditions. Cifuentes defines credibility as a condition in
which the deposit insurance system manages sufficient funds to cover
a number of bankruptcies but not a systemic crisis.
However, if deposit insurance systems are not intended to help
restore the intermediary role that banks perform in a systemic cri-
sis, then what is the role of a deposit insurance system in a highly
concentrated market with few actively operating banks? In this con-
text, the failure of a large bank will probably generate a demand for
reserve funds that the deposit insurance system is not able to meet,
and the authorities will have to conceive solutions beyond the mere
repayment of small depositors with the accumulated funds. Cifuentes
suggests that in a very concentrated market with few banks, large
depositors will be covered by a too-big-to-fail policy on behalf of the20 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
regulatory authorities. Levine (1999) and others point out that finan-
cial crises tend to occur less frequently in more concentrated mar-
kets, in which case the active use of the accumulated fund is less
clear.
Cifuentes compares the degree of effective protection provided by
the deposit insurance system in Chile and the United States, as the
extreme cases of a country with a few banks and a country with a
large number of banks. Cifuentes concludes that the effective protec-
tion—that is, the number of cases in which insured deposits are actu-
ally less than or equal to the deposit insurance fund—is much lower
in the case of Chile than in the United States. Deposit insurance in a
concentrated market like Chile is justified on the grounds of the rep-
resentation hypothesis of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). Customers
could anticipate the application of the too-big-to-fail doctrine, causing
a flight-to-size rather than the usual flight-to-quality phenomenon.
Finally, the author considers that the participation of the public sec-
tor in the funding of the deposit insurance depends on the primary
objective of the system. If the intention is to protect small depositors,
funding should be privately afforded. Public funding could be justified
if the deposit insurance system also serves to facilitate the liquida-
tion of a financial institution in coordination with crisis resolution
policies.
Cifuentes also addresses the issue of systemic risk and banking
concentration. Systemic risk, defined as the failure of a large part of
the banking system to perform its maturity transformation function,
can arise from several sources (see Dow, 2000): contagion from insol-
vent banks that generates bank runs on solvent ones; trough inter-
bank lending; a deterioration of asset prices owing to problems in a
group of banks; and common shocks that weaken a large fraction of
the banking system. Cifuentes, studies the implications of potential
systemic risk stemming from interbank linkages, based on the theo-
retical foundations of Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Freixas, Parigi,
and Rochet (2000).
Using the modeling framework of Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
Cifuentes examines whether the increase in the concentration of the
Chilean banking market has affected the system’s fragility. He finds
that systemic risk increases with the level of concentration owing to
contagion, but regulations that restrict exposure to interbank lend-
ing as a function of bank size are successful in controlling the spread
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This volume contains a number of macroeconomic and
microeconomic works on the subjects of monetary policy transmis-
sion and the regulation of the banking industry. The reason to con-
sider both issues in the same volume lies in the fact that some channels
whereby monetary policy reaches the real sector hinges on the struc-
ture of the banking sector (barriers to entry, degree of competition,
financial taxation, etc.)and on some informational distortions typi-
cally ascribed to the financial sector(lenders borrowers-relationship,
ownership relations, etc.)
The structure of the volume combines empirical and theoretical
contributions on issues that are relevant for Chile and other emerg-
ing economies. On the theoretical part we have learned how shock
are transmitted internationally and how this strongly affect small
open economies. It is argued in this volume that the effect depends
on the economy’s leverage and the presence of the financial accelera-
tor mechanism as an additional force that propagate the strength of
the shock.
On the empirical side the papers on monetary policy transmis-
sion show that the banks interest rates takes time to adjust to move-
ments in the monetary policy rate in developed countries. Nonetheless,
it is shown that Chile is not different from other countries (even de-
veloped ones) in terms of monetary policy rate transmission, and it
tends to pass through the monetary policy rate rapidly. The interna-
tional evidence presented here points the difference between the re-
action of consumption and investment to monetary shock in the euro
area and US. Some tentative and pioneer hypotheses are discussed
here. Concerning Chile, there is evidence of how the credit channel
has operated and the importance of the flight to quality hypothesis to
explain the transmission of the monetary policy in this economy.
 On issues related to the banking sector, the volume includes
several contributions that concentrate on the regulatory constraints
imposed on the industry based on the argument of its intrinsic vul-
nerability and the systemic repercussions of potential insolvency. The
most prominent of these is undoubtedly the deposit insurance scheme,
as part of a broader safety net constructed to dampen isolated bank-
ing crises. Among others regulations a paper in the volume review
the tax structure levied on the banking industry and how this affect
the functioning of the financial system.22 Luis A. Ahumada  and J. Rodrigo Fuentes
Another important institutional aspect of the banking sector is the
existence of barriers for foreign banks to entry in domestic capital
markets. The work in this book show that financial integration re-
duces the economic Luisvolatility in different states in the US but the
preliminary evidence point in the opposite direction for Latin America.
Also, financial policies that emphasize foreign bank entry denial in-
creases bank margins and reduce the efficiency of the banking system.
Finally, but no less important, the industry’s market structure -
in terms of either market concentration or interaction with related
financial intermediaries - is shown to play a key role in several char-
acteristics of the Chilean banking system. This microeconomic char-
acteristic determine the interest rate charged by banks, the access to
credit of small debtors and the spread obtained by the banks.
In summary, a common feature of the findings reported in these
works is that regulatory distortions have an important effect on the
efficiency and profitability of the banking industry. Whether we mea-
sure the spread from intermediation or the interest rates charged for
traditional banking activities, the microeconomic structure has an ef-
fect on these variables. The natural question to pursue involves the
effect of this regulatory and industry conditions on the transmission of
monetary policy. Certainly, the evidence presented in this volume pro-
vides interesting venues for future research and policy implications.Banking Industry and Monetary Policy: An Overview 23
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